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Abstract
This paper examines the role of the concluding myth of the Phaedo in the context 
of the dialogue as a whole, arguing that the myth’s exploration of the relationship 
between action, condition of soul and form of life provides valuable information 
about Plato’s conception of the kind of political environment necessary for human 
flourishing. It identifies three features of the myth essential to this exploration: its 
self-critical construction of the perspective of the makers of this myth, its focus on 
the conditions under which violent deeds are committed and its envisaging of the 
form of human community necessary for the expiation of such deeds. 
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Resumen
El artículo examina el papel del mito final del Fedón dentro del contexto de la totali-
dad del diálogo y argumenta que la exploración que hace el mito de la relación entre 
acción, condición del alma y forma de vida brinda importante información acerca 
de la concepción platónica del tipo de entorno político que favorece el florecimiento 
del ser humano. Identifica tres rasgos del mito que son esenciales para dicha explo-
ración: su construcción autocrítica de la perspectiva de los creadores del mito, su 
enfoque en las condiciones en las que se cometen actos violentos y su visión de una 
forma de comunidad humana necesaria para la expiación de tales actos.
Palabras clave: Platón, Fedón, escatología, mito.
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For all of the current scholarly debate surrounding Plato’s use 
of myth,1 its philosophical import,2 and the analyses of particular 
myths,3 David Sedley’s recent observation rings true: “It remains the 
case that Plato’s myths, for all the interest they have attracted, are far 
too rarely used in the interpretation of the dialogues to which they 
belong.” (51) A more integrative approach to Plato’s myths, one which 
seeks to understand them in the context of the animating questions of 
the dialogues in which they appear and to illuminate the sinews Plato 
constructs to connect the myths with the body of the dialogue, would 
avoid the danger of hypostatizing some elements of the dialogues 
while overlooking the critical appropriation of culturally embedded 
images and concepts with which these dialogues are filled. Indeed, 
if we discern the influence of myth broadly to include not only those 
passages explicitly called a μῦθος, but also the use of mythic imag-
ery, we find the dialogues so permeated by mythic content as to place 
scholarly consternation about the significance of myth for philosophy 
already at some remove from Plato’s work. At the same time, because 
Plato’s appropriation of myth-telling and mythic imagery is a criti-
cal appropriation −because Plato puts his myths to work− discerning 
their import for him and their role in the dialogues requires sorting 
out what it is that they do. 
Such an approach is particularly important for assessing the 
meaning and significance of Plato’s after-life myths. With a few 
notable exceptions,4 the general scholarly tendency has been to treat 
these myths as regrettable digressions from philosophic argumenta-
tion to a variety of more or less problematic stances toward mortality: 
religious conservatism, mysticism, bad faith, cynical demagoguery.5 
Even those scholars who see these myths as evidence of a tendency 
to locate the fullest and richest forms to which human life can avail 
itself in trans- or extra-political ends rarely offer much in the way of 
1 See, in particular the pivotal recent studies of Brisson, Morgan, and the collection of 
essays edited by Cataline Partenie, entitled Plato’s Myths, along with the earlier stud-
ies of J. A. Stewart and P. Futiger.
2 Of which Kathryn Morgan’s Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato is 
exemplary. 
3 Claudia Barrachi’s treatment of the myth of Er (2001) is especially thought provok-
ing, as is Alessandra Fussi’s 2010.
4 See fn 3 above, as well as Annas’ “Plato’s Myths of Judgment” (1982) and Sedley’s 
“Theology and Myth in the Phaedo” (1991), White’s Myth and Metaphysics in Plato’s 
Phaedo, Burger’s The Phaedo: A Platonic Labyrinth and Dorter’s study of the Phaedo.
5 Popper’s critique of Plato is perhaps the most extreme form of this criticism; Annas’ 
description of the myth of Er as a ‘vulgarity’ and ‘painful shock’ is often pointed to as 
representative of a milder form of this trend in scholarship (1981 349).
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analyses of the particular myths themselves.6 Overall, contemporary 
scholarly attention has tended more toward a focus on the fact that 
Plato composes after-life myths than on what is actually happening 
in these myths. 
With this paper, I would like to bracket, for a moment, the ques-
tion of why Plato availed himself to after-life myths in his dialogues 
and turn instead to look carefully at what is being said and done in 
these myths. That is, I would like to investigate what mythic after-life 
tropes allow Plato to do, what use he makes of them, taking the myth 
of the earth near the conclusion of the Phaedo as the specific subject 
of analysis. I will argue that there are three features of this myth that 
must be taken into account when assessing its place in the dialogue and 
that should enter into broader considerations of Plato’s use of afterlife 
imagery. First, the myth of the earth contains a decisively critical ori-
entation, not only to some other depictions of the afterlife, but also 
to the perspective from which its own depiction emerges. This is to 
say, the myth includes an account of the mythmakers themselves, one 
which attributes to them a limited and fragmentary vision of what is. 
Secondly, whatever form of justice emerges from this myth does so on 
the basis of a shift from the cultural focus on the anger of the victim 
to the psychic condition of the ‘perpetrator’.7 The myth seeks to isolate 
and contain the effects of vicious and violent action to the agent of the 
deed. Thus, I will argue that the myth presents less a futural theodicy 
(that is, a vision of justice to come) than a nascent phenomenology of 
violence (an attempt to consider the uncanny endurance of violent 
deeds). Finally, the specific focus on the effect of violent deeds is con-
nected to a broader reflection on the community in which these deeds 
are committed, the social arena in which their effects are manifest 
and the kind of community necessary for any possible expiation. That 
is, granting the rather fantastical character of this vision of justice in 
which vicious deeds are expiated by dwelling in a particular place for 
a particular time, I will argue that this is a fantasy of community. 
This final dimension opens up for consideration the broader 
political and philosophical efficacy of the after-life myths, and returns 
6 This view, that Plato maintains trans-political ends as the highest human goals, is 
shared by scholars from quite diverse approaches and backgrounds, see for instance, 
Bobonich’s “Plato’s Utopia Recast”, Ludwig’s essay “Eros in the Republic” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic and McNeill’s “An Image of the Soul in 
Speech”.
7 For discussions of the decisive role of the anger of the victim in Athenian penal law, 
see Saunders, Allen, Mackenzie and Konstan. This shift is also operative in Plato’s 
Apology as well as his Laws, whose model of penal law Saunders describes as coming 
very close to eradicating the rubric of punishment entirely (178).
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us to the question of why Plato might include after-life myths in the 
dialogues. Over the course of the next few pages I hope to make 
compelling the merits of approaching this larger question not only 
by asking whether Plato requires one to posit trans-political ends as 
the goal toward which a flourishing human life will tend, but also by 
looking carefully at his sustained consideration of the political and 
philosophic impact on human life of positing extra-political ends. 
Ultimately, doing so would also require us to reconsider what Plato 
means by ‘immortality’, a much larger task than can be done within 
a single paper. I submit that this analysis of the Phaedo’s myth of the 
earth contributes to this task, however, by arguing that its account 
of the fate of the human soul is an attempt to mark the endurance 
of psychic effects beyond the life of their ‘agent’; and thus that it 
develops a vision of the polis as housing and memorializing traces of 
psychic effects and of human political life as defined by the challenge 
of determining how to act within this arena. That is, the myth treats 
‘immortality’ as an idiom by means of which Plato considers the polis 
both in its effects on ψυχή and as itself an effect of ψυχή; it provides 
a lens through which human beings can conceive of the life of their 
deeds beyond the life of themselves. When viewed in this context, the 
particular features of this after-life myth suggest that, for Plato, being 
with others in a community in a manner that is productive of human 
flourishing (or simply in a manner that is philosophically interest-
ing) requires some sense of the relative endurance of one’s actions; 
positing extra-political ends to human life provides one means of cul-
tivating this sense. This in turn suggests that the pursuit of these ends 
is itself a deeply political pursuit.
***
The myth of the earth is given as a supplement to the four λόγοι 
about immortality that structure much of the Phaedo. Socrates con-
cludes the fourth account with the observation that it is to the care 
of the soul that they must turn, “not only for this time in which we 
call ‘being alive’ goes on, but for time as a whole” (107c).8 And yet, if 
his subsequent account is indeed of time as a whole, it is the place in 
which such time unfolds that is given the greatest attention. The myth 
about the earth Socrates offers provides an image of the scene of dura-
tion, an image of what we might call ‘doing time,’ in which the site of 
the ‘doing’ is the subject of description. Socrates returns to the mythic 
context in which the four λόγοι began by first offering a preliminary 
description of the soul’s journey to Hades (107c-108c), then giving 
an extended myth of the earth (108d-114c) in which he describes the 
8 All citations are taken from the Brann, Kalkavage and Salem.
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whole earth (108d-109b) and its various regions (109b-113c), and con-
cluding with an account of the experiences of the souls of the dead 
under and upon its surface (113d-114c).
Certainly, the myth resumes the valorization of the philosophic 
life begun early on in the dialogue with Socrates’ defense of his cheer-
fulness in the face of his imminent demise (Apo. 63a-69e). Socrates 
does indeed conclude the myth by observing that such a conception 
of the afterlife urges confidence in the face of death for those who have 
led a certain kind of life (Phd. 114d-e). However, the account of the 
fate of philosophic souls hardly exhausts the descriptive possibilities 
opened up by this passage, nor does it explain the length and detail 
with which Socrates speculates about the afterlife. Moreover, given 
Socrates’ own uncertainty about the extent to which he resembles 
the true-born philosopher (Apo. 69d),9 a figure who seems to fare so 
well in this image of the afterlife, there is reason to wonder why we 
should impute to this myth any motive other than the one Socrates 
himself gives, namely that it is good to chant such stories to oneself in 
confronting one’s death.10 This story unfolds within a haze of fantasy, 
and the myth’s therapeutic function is bound up with its fantastical 
character. In depicting the hours before Socrates’ death, Plato pres-
ents a Socrates who allows himself in private conversation with his 
friends to dwell on a topic he permitted himself only brief mention in 
his public defense (29a-b and 39e-41e), namely, what might await one 
beyond death. However, the fantastical character of this passage alone 
is not grounds for ignoring it. Fantasy lends itself to analysis, and this 
is a very particular vision whose details merit attention. Moreover, 
Socrates’ conclusion, namely that care for the soul should be one’s 
concern in the course of one’s life (Phd. 114d-e), emphasizes the this-
worldly effects of belief in an immortal soul: such a belief involves a 
particular stance toward one’s mortality and toward the manner of 
life one attempts to lead. 
Socrates’ this-worldly orientation is apparent throughout this 
story, wherein souls accompanied by only their nurture and educa-
tion (Phd. 107d) submit themselves to a justice that is enacted by the 
9 I take this uncertainty to be read as sincere because it resonates with other features 
of the dialogue that distance Socrates from his account of the ‘true-born’ philoso-
pher, particularly in Socrates’ invocation of eagerness, προθυμία, a condition that 
requires the cooperation of soul and body, not their divergence. For more on the 
role of προθυμία in Socrates’ defense of his confidence on the face of death, see my 
“Politics and Psychology in Plato’s Phaedo, Republic and Laws”.
10 “And he should sing, as it were, incantations [ἐπᾴδειν] to himself over and over again; 
and that’s just why I’ve drawn out the story for so long” (Phd. 114d); such stories are 
worth listening to (110b).
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manner and duration of their dwelling upon an earth outfitted with 
regions appropriate to them. Indeed, the myth’s emphasis on place 
sharpens the focus on the manner and conditions in which human 
lives are lived in community with one another.11 Socrates produces 
here a sustained meditation on the relationship between human 
action, condition of soul and quality of life. Part cosmology, part 
anthropology, Socrates’ myth of the earth describes an environment 
resplendent with a variety of communities and a variety of means 
for expiating actions. It is grounded in offering a description of 
human dwelling as the site in which justice is enacted, violent deeds 
are expiated and souls are perpetually re-absorbed and digested or 
quarantined. It provides a vision of human life that takes seriously 
the burden of describing the effects of action on the condition of one’s 
soul and the quality of one’s life. This character is most clearly seen in 
the two accounts of the fate of souls in Hades that bookend the myth.
***
The myth of the earth is introduced with a re-telling of what is 
said about the soul’s fate in Hades, a re-telling whose emphasis on 
the variety of souls results in a critique of Aeschylus’s character 
Telephus, who claimed the journey to Hades was simple.12 Instead, 
states Socrates, taking as evidence “the rites and lawful ceremonies 
practiced here” (Phd. 108a), the ways to Hades are many.13 As the story 
unfolds, the variety of paths available to souls provides one way in 
11 In responding to Hackforth’s characterization of the myth of the earth as a presenta-
tion of the immaterial in material form (186), Dorter (165) observes that it is rather 
more the case that the myth presents an image of the life of the soul while connected 
to the body, thereby presenting, “the timeless in temporal form, or the implicit pres-
ent in an explicit future”. Ahrensdorf offers a similar account of the myth as more 
concerned with this-worldly affairs than with other-worldly affairs (193). I am deeply 
sympathetic to both these readings. My point is simply that the myth’s presentation 
of what Dorter calls the ‘implicit present’ occurs not primarily through a discussion 
of time but through an account of place.
12 W. D. Geddes maintains that this passage is an allusion to the ritual sacrifice to 
Hecate that was made at crossroads (142), but see Dorter’s response to Geddes (170).
13 For a discussion of the mythic tradition from which Plato is drawing here, see 
Edmunds’ Myths of the Underworld Journey (188-90). By citing as evidence particular 
practices Plato signals that Socrates’ criticism of Telephus does not involve a com-
plete rejection of religious practice, but neither does it simply affirm this practice. 
We have here an example of Plato’s critical appropriation. It is as though he is saying, 
insofar as you participate in these rites, you are already committed to the belief that 
the ways to Hades are many. And what is behind this claim is the notion that not all 
fates in Hades are the same. Socrates takes this to mean that there are real differences 
between conditions of soul and that these differences are at least in part a function of 
one’s actions. 
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which differences between souls can be described and illustrates both 
their need for a guide and the wretchedness of those souls who, on 
account of their viciousness, are bereft of guidance (108a). The criti-
cal tenor of Socrates’ re-telling is maintained throughout this initial 
exchange, which culminates in Socrates drawing into question not 
only what has been said about the soul’s journey in Hades but what 
has been said about the earth itself: “And many and wondrous are the 
earth’s regions, and earth itself is neither of the sort nor the size it’s 
held to be in the opinion of those who usually speak about earth, as 
I’ve been persuaded by somebody” (108c). Socrates’ corrective engage-
ment with poetic and ‘scientific’ traditions about the soul’s journey 
to Hades and about the size and constitution of the earth serves to 
underscore that critical engagement he has maintained throughout 
the four λόγοι and also indicates that the realm of myth is not a placid 
telling of accepted doctrine but an agonistic battle for authority.14 
Thus, Socrates’ return to myth is not a move from dialectical engage-
ment to uncontested territory.
Moreover, Socrates’ myth of the earth is not merely one version of 
an account of earth that would vie with others; it is not simply a myth 
about the earth at all, but a description of the very perspective from 
which he and his interlocutors have been speaking about the earth, 
the soul and body, and the fates that await them. The myth of the 
true earth offers, among other things, a commentary on perspective 
itself. The myth creates an image of the earth that incorporates, in a 
decisively critical manner, the mythmakers themselves: Socrates and 
his interlocutors are likened to residents of the earth’s hollows who 
mistake their dwelling for the surface of the earth (Phd. 109c-d). Thus, 
this myth includes a self-description which serves as an acknowledg-
ment of blurred vision and as a provocation to correct this vision.15 
Specifically, according to Socrates, he and his interlocutors have been 
operating with an impoverished view and understanding, they are 
guilty of mistaking their own experience for how things really are; 
Socrates’ repeated assertions that he would not insist upon the truth 
of the tale he is telling needs to be read in light of the depiction he has 
given of his own fragmentary perspective (108d, 114d).
14 For a helpful account of the agonistic dimension of myth-telling, see Edmunds’ in-
troduction to his study of Greek conceptions of the afterlife (1-28).
15 Part of the significance of this passage is the degree to which it calls into question 
and submits for critical assessment all that Socrates and his interlocutors have 
discussed and agreed upon throughout the dialogue. It emphasizes the need for re-
peated and consistent examination of these accounts, as Socrates himself suggests 
(Phd. 106b and 114d-e).
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Were we tempted to wonder how Socrates has been afforded 
this purchase on his own perspective, this viewing of his own place, 
we would have to recall that Socrates is using a vocabulary that has 
already been made available to him by a long tradition of myths. The 
variety and plasticity of traditional mythic stories provides Socrates 
with the very means of critiquing this tradition, and, moreover, 
allows Socrates to make an image of himself. Plato thus utilizes the 
language of myth to critique not only other myths but to critique the 
myth-makers themselves. The Phaedo’s play with a number of afterlife 
themes results in a self-critiquing myth, a dialectical mythology.16 
The description of the earth that is produced from this appro-
priation of poetic language is striking in its fecund and self-possessed 
complexity. In fact, the true earth Socrates describes teems with the 
variant and the plural. We will pick up with Socrates’ initial account 
of what happens to souls. 
According to Socrates, all souls are led by the δαίμων that was 
assigned to them in life to a region where the dead, who have been 
collected together and submit themselves to justice, begin their jour-
ney. Because there are a variety of paths or ways to take, a guide is 
necessary for each soul to transport that soul “There” (presumably to 
Hades and to the specific region of Hades that correspond to them), 
where the soul encounters and undergoes what it must encounter and 
undergo, “for the needed time.” Once this period of time has elapsed 
another guide returns the soul “here,” “over the course of many −and 
long− circuits of time” (Phd. 108b). Socrates is quite clear from the 
start of this account what it is designed to illustrate: Because the soul 
is deathless and thus death is not “freedom from time as a whole” 
(which would be a comfort to “bad men” 107c), there is the greatest 
need to care for the soul and to seek the only refuge and safety avail-
able, namely that attained by becoming as good and thoughtful as 
possible. Such conditions of soul can provide a refuge because soul 
goes into Hades, “with nothing else except her nurture and educa-
tion [τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς]” (107d).17 Indeed, one’s nurture and 
education will help determine the kind of journey one undergoes. 
The soul that is both “orderly and thoughtful” follows along and isn’t 
ignorant of what has happened to it, namely, that it has been separated 
from body. The body-loving and body-like soul (Socrates explicitly 
16 For a more detailed discussion of the dialogic context in which this self-critical di-
mension of the Phaedo myth emerges, see Brill “The Geography of Finitude” (5-23).
17 Note the resonance with the account of soul’s judgment in Gorgias, in which differ-
ences of body, wealth and family are not treated as relevant to the judiciary process, 
whereas differences of region are (524a).
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calls attention to the fact that this is the soul he described previously) 
remains for a long time fluttering around the body, and only goes off 
to make the journey to Hades resistant and suffering, led away by its 
δαίμων. Of the souls that have arrived at the staging ground for their 
journey to Hades, those who are impure and have done impure things 
are shunned by the other souls who want neither to journey with nor 
guide them. Such a soul, “wanders around all by herself, lost in a state 
of total perplexity, until certain periods of time have passed, and, 
once they’re over, she’s carried under pain of necessity to the dwelling 
that is fitting for her” (108c).18
This preliminary account of the soul’s journey to Hades operates 
by way of a logic of containment that connects deed with agent, a logic 
opened with the observation that the roads to Hades are many. This 
is the case because different souls have different fates allotted to them 
in the basis of the condition in which they ‘enter’ Hades that is, the 
condition they are in at the time of death. Thus, a detail of landscape 
provides the means for indicating differences of psychic condition. 
Accompanied by their nurture and education, souls are submitted 
to a fate that belongs to them alone. Led by guides that have been 
assigned to them, to a path that is their own (later we learn that this 
includes traveling on a vehicle reserved for them, Phd. 113d), they 
embark on a journey that will take them to their place of residence 
for a fixed amount of time. In containing the expiation of the deed 
to the treatment undergone by the soul of the agent, Socrates’ tale 
strives to avoid a traditionally tragic context, namely, the visitation of 
unexpiated wrongs and their affects upon generation after generation 
of the agent of the deed. Socrates’ tale seeks to eliminate the possi-
bility of unexpiated deeds by maintaining the connection between 
deed and agent, by presenting death as a landscape and expiation as a 
function of residence. However, that souls are accompanied by their 
nurture and education serves as a sign that action alone is not the 
sole determinant of condition of soul. The effects of other people and 
institutions are also worn on the ψυχή, so to speak, and the accom-
paniment of nurture and education gesture toward the effects on the 
soul of extra-individual institutions, family and community. In these 
accompaniments, the polis looms large. 
This logic of containment is complemented by a system of dis-
tinctions by means of which souls are distinguished on the basis 
of their purity and impurity and allotted fates according to these 
conditions. The distinction between pure (orderly and thoughtful) 
18 Notice the conjunction of confusion, wandering, resistance, force, necessity and 
isolation.
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souls and impure (filled with desire for the body) souls will even-
tually mutate into a more complex set of distinctions with at least 
four types: middling souls, corrupt but curable souls, corrupt and 
incurable souls, and just or holy souls. By the end of the passage, this 
complex typology is collapsed back into two kinds: body-loving and 
learning-loving (Phd. 114e). The differing fates of pure and impure 
souls are a function of the differences between those souls’ knowledge 
of their own condition: orderly and thoughtful souls are aware that 
they are separated from the body, and submit themselves to their fates 
without resistance. Body-loving souls are ignorant of themselves and 
their status, resist departure from the realm of the living and haunt 
the resting place of the body. These souls enact the attitude of people 
who have failed to properly comport themselves toward their own 
mortality, failed to acknowledge themselves as subject to death. In 
its account of their ignorance about themselves this description reso-
nates with the description earlier on the dialogue of the lives of those 
who have body-loving souls −they are unable to grasp being, unable 
to understand what is really the case (Apo. 64c-69e; 80b-84b). Such 
souls are only carried off to their fate by force and with difficulty (βίᾳ 
καὶ μόγις) (Phd. 108b). When such souls finally arrive in Hades, if they 
have committed unjust and violent deeds, they are isolated, bereft of 
companions or guides; filled with perplexity (ἀπορίᾳ) they wander 
(πλανᾶται) until carried to their proper region, “under pain of neces-
sity [ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης]” (108c). Their ignorance about themselves subjects 
them to violent compulsion and necessity; their commission of unjust 
deeds to isolation and wandering. Alternately, the pure and sensible 
soul journeys with and is led by gods to dwell in a region that is fit-
ting for it (108c), a region containing temples and groves in which the 
gods dwell, “and their utterances and prophecies and perceptions of 
the gods and all such forms of intercourse with the gods comes about 
for them face to face” (111b-c). The conditions under which these souls 
flourish stand in stark contrast to the automatic processes governed by 
necessity to which other souls are subject; indeed, Socrates’ emphasis 
on the presence of the gods signifies an exemption from the forces of 
violence and constraint by means of which necessity acts. After this 
description of the conditions of the soul’s journeys, Socrates turns 
to give an account of the earth and is regions −the hollows, the sur-
face and the underworld. We will pick up with his description of the 
underworld.19 
19 For a discussion of possible cosmological sources for Socrates description of the 
whole earth, see Morrison.
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***
While the account of the whole earth emphasizes a unified plu-
rality of color and life −Socrates describes it as “a single form of Earth, 
continuous and dappled” (Phd. 110d)− the account of the various 
regions under the earth describes a world of teeming forces and flows, 
of pulsions, of pendulums, of breaths and winds, a world of mani-
fold forces. The variety of flows −flows of water, of mud, of air and of 
fire− interact with force by coiling, by descending and ascending, by 
seething, by erupting, by rushing. Thus the motion of water, earth, 
and air under the earth is errant and pendulous, subject to chance 
and without foundation (111d-112e).20 It is by these motions that the 
underworld animates the earth. Surely this identification of the cause 
of the swinging motion under the earth is as distant as can be from 
the balance and equipoise, the self-sameness, of the earth when 
viewed from above and as a whole (108e-109a); nevertheless this very 
earth includes the foundationless, baseless liquid and is traversed by 
the very flows it makes possible. Nor is even this motion without some 
ὁμοίωσις −the rivers become like the earth through which they flow− 
and predictability: when water recedes in one area, it flows into the 
opposite area. Thus, Socrates’ account of the motions under the earth 
includes a kinesiology that invokes both chance and self-sameness. 
The mingling of chance and necessity, the description of foundation-
less yet predictable motion all serve the imagery of an earth that is 
a complex whole, one capable of maintaining its equilibrium amidst 
even the strongest of internal motions. Like the living body itself, 
the earth’s underworld is a mixture of constancy and inconstancy, 
errancy and repetition.21 
In this general milieu of mingling and resemblance, four bodies 
of water are marked off from one another, at least two of which are 
distinct because they do not mingle with the others (Phd. 113b-c), the 
rivers Pyriphlegethon and Cocytus. Such an account invites one to 
compare the motions of the rivers that encircle and run beneath the 
earth with desire and its workings, which Socrates will describe in 
the Republic as like a stream whose current can be made to flow in a 
20 This imagery of a baseless, foundationless flowing and of a motion that partakes of 
chance, begs comparison with the discussion of χώρα in the Timaeus as the errant 
cause, the receptacle of being.
21 Indeed, the very physical, bodily account of the underworld and its circulatory sys-
tem is made more explicit as Socrates continues his description of the movement of 
water, earth, and air under the earth: “just as when people breathe, the breath, as it 
flows, is always breathed out and breathed in, so also there the breath, as it swings 
along with the liquid, brings about certain dreadful and monstrous winds as it goes 
in and out” (Phd. 112b).
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number of directions (485d).22 And it is with this oblique reference to 
the pushing and pulling of desire that Socrates returns to the task with 
which he began his mythic geography, namely, locating the fate of the 
human soul in and on the earth. Reiterating that all souls, regardless 
of how they have lived their lives, are gathered together and submit 
themselves to justice, Socrates offers the following general schema of 
what happens to souls in Hades. Those souls that led what Socrates 
describes as ‘middling lives’ can expect the following journey: they 
travel on foot to Acheron where they encounter rafts “reserved for 
them” by means of which they arrive at the Acherousian Lake, where, 
“the soul’s of many who’ve met their end keep arriving, and after stay-
ing for certain allotted times −some longer, some shorter− are sent 
out again into the generation of the living” (Phd. 113a). These souls 
dwell on the lake and, “purified [καθαιρόμενοι] by paying the pen-
alty [διδόντες δίκας] for their unjust deeds” (113d-e) are eventually 
released, carrying off honors for their good deeds. This presentation 
of purification as a payment of penalty elides punishment with an 
alteration of psychic condition. Moreover, Socrates leaves his account 
of this payment somewhat underdetermined −it seems to consist sim-
ply in dwelling in a particular place for a particular period of time. 
Thus, purification is purchased by taking up residence in a certain 
environment.
Another category of souls, the incurables, so-called because of 
the, “magnitude of their misdeeds” are cast into Tartarus, “from which 
there is no exit” (Phd. 113e-114a). Presumably, these souls are incur-
able because there is no payment possible to return their injustice, no 
value can be set that would allow for such payment. So excessive are 
their misdeeds, no calculus exists to calculate their payment, no cur-
rency to make such payment. 
Those souls who have committed misdeeds that are curable 
“although great,”23 a designation presumably made to distinguish 
between these, the lesser injustices that some of the souls residing 
on the Acherousan Lake have committed, and the deeds that render 
their doer incurable, are “of necessity [ἀνάγκη Phd. 114a]” rushed 
into Tartarus. However, for these souls some mechanism of release 
22 For a more extensive discussion of the connection between Socrates’ description of 
the rivers that run beneath the earth and the passions of the soul, see Burger 197-200.
23 The examples Socrates gives here are informative: “for example, those who’ve 
practiced some violence against father or mother under the influence of anger [ὑπ’ 
ὀργῆς] and live out the rest of their lives in repentance, or those who became homi-
cides in some other such way” (Phd. 114a). In the Laws Plato will create a category 
of misdeed, homicide in anger (866d-e), which, according to Saunders, was without 
precedent in Athenian law (225).
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has been devised. After residing in Tartarus for a year, they are dis-
charged, the homicides to freezing Cocytus and the parricides and 
matricides to fiery Pyriphlegethon.24 The path of these rivers is such 
that they afford for a brief period of time sufficient proximity to the 
Acherousian Lake as to allow the souls rushing along them to call out 
to the souls residing in the Lake, supplicating and entreating those 
souls against which they have aggressed, with the hopes of persuad-
ing them to receive them into the Lake. Those souls who are successful 
are granted entry into the community of the majority of souls. 
As several scholars have noted, the mechanics of redemption pre-
sented by this account are dubious.25 There seems to be no guarantee 
24 On the question of why some souls would be burnt and others frozen, Edmunds 
notes that it is likely that this distinction plays upon a mythic tradition now lost to us 
(213), while Burger emphasizes the reference to a variety of experiences made by the 
names of these rivers, and suggests the effects of the rivers resonates with the effect of 
these experiences (cf. 197-200).
25 Annas offers a particularly clear discussion of this problem (cf. 1982). She asserts 
that the cosmological elements of this myth are in tension with the depiction of final 
judgment in the myth. According to Annas the problem with this tension is that it 
results in two competing conceptions of punishment. On the one hand, the trope 
of reincarnation suggests that embodiment is punishment for the possession of a 
corrupt soul and the myth’s claim that only philosophic souls will be allowed to per-
sist in a disembodied state proposes disembodiment as their reward (Phd. 114c). On 
the other hand, the specific character of the earth suggests a form of punishment 
on the basis of the experiences souls undergo while disembodied. When combined, 
these two forms of punishment suggest that no matter how thorough the punish-
ment one undergoes while disembodied, all but a very few souls will then undergo 
that added insult of returning to bodies. Annas sees this somewhat pessimistic view 
as a mean between the optimistic final judgment scene in the Gorgias and the heavi-
er pessimism of the myth of Er in the Republic, where very little room is left open 
for individual souls to change the outcome of their lives. This is a compelling and 
provocative comparison; however, it does not take into account the work that the 
description of regions of the earth does, namely, provide yet another means of de-
scribing different kinds of souls and emphasizing the variety of forms of viciousness. 
In the myth of the earth, the theme of reincarnation is alluded to, but is by no means 
the central theme of the myth. Gallop, like Annas, maintains that what is said in the 
myth is incompatible with the theme of reincarnation utilized earlier (Gallop 224). 
However, by my reading, since the main work of the theme of reincarnation was to 
supply Socrates with some means of distinguishing between kinds of souls, a robust 
account of reincarnation is no longer needed in the myth of the earth because its 
work is done instead by a description of regions of the earth. Rather than attribut-
ing this difference between accounts of punishment to Plato’s pessimism, I suggest 
that it is a function of a shift in approach to developing a taxonomy of conditions 
of soul, one which moves from characterizing different psychological conditions as 
akin to animals to characterizing different psychological conditions on the basis of 
geographic features.
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that the souls against which one has aggressed will even be residing in 
the Lake at the same time as the aggressing soul is rushing around in 
its respective river. I would like, however, to draw our attention to the 
descriptive possibilities this passage provides. I am particularly inter-
ested in two features of this discussion. First, the manner in which the 
geography in this part of the myth provides a way of thinking about 
action and its effects on the whole. In drawing distinctions between 
kinds of vicious acts the myth offers a way of considering carefully 
the effect of certain actions, and a way of describing those effects. By 
concretizing these effects into places and processes one gets a sense 
for the effect of the action on the whole community. This is to say, the 
myth provides resources for considering the effect of human action 
within the entire arena of human community. Second, I would like 
to explore the specific possibility for contending with certain unjust 
actions this section of the myth presents thorough the possible re-
absorption of fugitive souls. 
With respect to its framing of the effects of human action, the 
earth’s mythic geography offers a way of figuring liminal action, both 
that which is exemplary and that which is degenerate. Pure and pious 
souls (the souls of the philosophers) are permitted to dwell on the 
surface of the earth in the company of gods. The suggestion here is 
that adopting the manner of life of the philosopher wins one a certain 
freedom from the circulation between various dwellings and processes 
that most other souls must undergo. Impure souls whose actions are 
incurable, that is, of a number and magnitude of injustice as to be 
incapable of compensating for their effects, are cast into Tartarus with 
no possibility of release. Thus, on the one hand the extremity of these 
actions is emphasized; bereft of a means of correcting them, such souls 
are also exempt from the processes that offer a means of repayment. 
On the other hand, because even the worst injustices are neither with-
out place nor without some description of them and their effects, the 
intelligibility of even these actions is assured. The allocation of incur-
able souls to Tartarus assures the quarantine, and thus the limitation 
of the effects, of even the most heinous deeds. There is no crime so 
great that it does not have some corresponding place, some means of 
describing its effects. Even the prohibition of re-absorption does not 
render impossible some illustration of the effect of the act −radical iso-
lation. This section of the myth offers a categorization of actions (those 
that can be re-absorbed and those that cannot), a way of viewing their 
effect on the whole, and also a way of thinking about how to contend 
with some of those actions (re-absorption or quarantine). 
A second feature of this geography is the mechanism it pro-
vides for the digestion of vicious deeds through the re-integration of 
I&V149_Cuerpo.indd   98 19/09/12   16:41
[ 9 9]
ideas y valores · vol. lxi · n.o 149 • agosto de 2012 • issn 0120-0062 (impreso)  2011-3368 (en línea) • bogotá, colombia • pp. 85 - 102
On the Uses and Abuses of Eschatology for Life
fugitive souls into the process most souls undergo. Isolated by their 
misdeeds both in their journey to Hades26 and once they have arrived, 
those who have committed great but curable misdeeds spend a year 
in Taratarus and then are rushed to either Cocytus or Pyriphlegethon 
(depending on the kind of misdeed), rivers which Socrates empha-
sizes do not mix with any others (Phd. 113b and c). These souls are 
literally consumed by the earth and brought into its circulation by 
their placement in its rushing rivers. The digestion of these souls can 
go in one of two ways, it seems; either they circulate in perpetuity 
or they are received into the company of the majority of other souls. 
The possibility of re-integration is afforded by another geographical 
feature: the brief proximity to the Lake that each river offers them is 
the necessary means by which they gain access to the ears of their 
potential liberators. The geography depicts, and its curious structure 
enables, a digestion of (a having done with) misdeeds by means of 
a process whereby the doer is potentially permitted re-entry into 
normalcy. Denied community with one another by the rushing to 
which they are subject, these souls focus instead on gaining reception 
to the Acherousian Lake, and their means for doing so is to suppli-
cate, entreat and persuade those against whom they have aggressed 
to receive them. It is only if they are successful in doing so that they 
are released from the rushing river and allowed entry into the Lake 
and thus eventually back into the circulation to which most souls are 
subject. We might wonder about this rhetoric for the damned −in 
what it would consist, what kinds of arguments and claims might be 
made that would be effective, in what ways it might resemble court-
room rhetoric and in what ways diverge. Socrates’ silence on this front 
makes these questions unanswerable, at least within the context of 
this text. However, what is striking in all of this is the connection this 
geography permits between aggressor and aggressed.27 If part of the 
purpose of the passage is to give an account of what as required for the 
expiation of certain deeds and of the condition of the agent of such 
deeds, then the passage suggests that redemption is made by gaining 
some access to the victim and attaining some means of persuading 
the victim to release and receive the agent. The ‘time’ of the deed 
26 The impure do not find fellow travelers or guides, not even, it would seem, among 
other impure souls, souls with which they are akin. Socrates specifies that the impure 
soul wanders around alone and perplexed for a set period of time before going on its 
journey (Phd. 108b-c).
27 The assertion of a connection between aggressor and aggressed is not without sup-
port in other elements of Greek society, especially in the religious beliefs about the 
context of impurity that pervades the act of homicide, see Parker. In the Laws we will 
see Plato compose laws that reflect these beliefs.
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is the ‘time’ in which this particular relationship stands. Expiation 
consists of forgiveness, or, to follow more closely the language of the 
text, expiation is the attainment of reception, winning the victim’s 
willingness to extend hospitality to the offender. The contingency of 
expiation places the burden of its accomplishment upon securing a 
particular form of access and appeal.
We are now in a position to re-integrate this account of the vari-
ous fates human soul encounter on and in the earth with the account 
of the earth itself. The language of flow and the emphasis on mul-
tiplicity serve as a means for describing varieties of souls, as souls 
find themselves in particular regions (subject to particular modes 
of conveyance) by means of their various conditions with respect to 
virtue and vice. Because souls find themselves in places that corre-
spond to their condition, which is itself determined by their actions, 
the emphasis on places appropriate to the soul is also an emphasis 
on the reciprocity between action and environment. The description 
of what happens to corrupt souls entails a description of the envi-
ronment that surrounds the corrupted soul. The isolation, confusion 
and wandering of unjust souls at the start of their journey to Hades 
(Phd. 108a-c), the drowning, freezing and burning of murderous souls 
while in Hades and the need of these souls to perpetually and per-
haps fruitlessly seek forgiveness in order to be liberated from their 
circumstances (113e-114c), all provide resources for speaking about the 
conditions of souls in this life as much as in another. Indeed, the myth 
provides a critical lens through which Socrates and his interlocutors 
can view their own purchase on the soul. What is won in the myth is 
the identification of Socrates’ and his interlocutors’ own perspective; 
they are put in their place. 
This place, the earth as Socrates’ myth presents it, encompasses 
both a variety of processes, circuits and locals, some more desirable 
than others, and the possibility of freedom from process (as figured by 
the dwellings of the pure, on the surface of the earth and in even more 
fantastic dwellings). In so describing earth, this myth provides Socrates 
and his interlocutors with resources for considering the effects of their 
actions on the community in which they reside in this life, and thus 
implicitly locates Socrates’ claim to care for their souls in the effects 
such care has for the city. Ultimately, the myth also presents the dream 
of limiting the effects of vicious deeds and doing so in such a manner 
that is in accord with, and even a function of, the structure and opera-
tion of the whole earth. While, as Brann has noted (18), no cities appear 
in Socrates’ myth of the earth, the myth provides an image of human 
community that limits viciousness in accord with the cosmos. In so 
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doing, it presents a provocation to arrive at such a community and to 
envisage what manner of political life would make this possible.
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